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This edition of the American University Law Review demonstrates
the broad jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. These articles cover substantive legal issues in the
areas of tax, international trade, intellectual property, federal per-
sonnel, and federal procurement. Yet these articles do not cover all
of the vital areas of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction. The Federal
Circuit's enabling legislation also gives appellate jurisdiction over
fifth amendment takings claims, military review cases, Indian claims,
and other Tucker Act' cases.
In light of the Federal Circuit's broad jurisdiction, few remember
that opponents of its creation charged that it was a specialized court.
Thus, the Federal Circuit provides a convenient model with which
to examine congressional response to specialized courts. This arti-
cle briefly revisits the creation of the Federal Circuit and examines
* Judge Rader was appointed as a United States Circuit Judge for the Federal Circuit
on August 3, 1990. Prior to his appointment, he served as a judge on the United States
Claims Court. Before entering the judiciary, Judge Rader was counsel on the SenateJudiciary
Committee.
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1988).
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Congress' pattern of committing specialized jurisdiction to article I
courts.
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: CREATION OF A "SPECIALIZED" COURT?
Throughout the development of the legislation which eventually
gave birth to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, naysayers assailed the various bills. Antagonists charged
that the proposed court would be a specialized court-a court dedi-
cated primarily to the detailed field of patent law. Other critics,
seizing on this idea, charged that the creation of one specialized
subject matter court would undoubtedly lead to the establishment
of more article III specialty courts. Still other critics contended that
"specialized" courts breed a multitude of ills which frustrate the
aims of a generalized judiciary.
Senator Max Baucus (D. Montana), sought to squelch the Federal
Circuit before its inception, stating that its enabling legislation "cre-
ates a centralized specialty court. ' 2 For Senator Baucus, the princi-
pal issue was "whether Congress should attempt first to address
such problems [in the patent system] by creating a centralized spe-
cialty court or whether there are other avenues available, that do not
have the severe negative consequences presented by a specialized
court."
3
Senator Baucus and others advocated, as an alternative to crea-
tion of the Federal Circuit, legislation to resolve proven and poten-
tial ambiguities in patent law. Senator Baucus stated:
It is ironic that many of those in the Senate who are so concerned
about judicial activism would support an approach that creates a
new court first, rather than attempting to give the existing courts
better direction.4
While he admitted a "greater need for clarity and uniformity in pat-
ent law," 5 Senator Baucus opined that the creation of the Federal
Circuit was simply an example of Congress' "passing the buck" to a
new forum instead of clarifying patent law. 6
Senator Alan K. Simpson (R. Wyoming) disapproved of the pro-
posal to vest the Federal Circuit with subject matter jurisdiction
over particular legal fields. Senator Simpson argued against special-
ization. He feared the new court would necessarily sacrifice the "di-
2. 127 CONG. REC. 29,862 (1981).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 29,861.
6. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 40-41 (1981). Senator Baucus doubted that a
specialized court would remove the ambiguity from a substantive area of law. Id.
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versity of opinion stemming from divergent points of view and
sometimes differing strains of geographical philosophy and
thought."' 7 This argument is the primary criticism of specialized
courts in general. In addition, Senator Simpson charged that the
Federal Circuit's central location would require all litigants to take
their cases to distant Washington, D.C. 8
The Federal Circuit's opponents also feared that the new court
would set the stage for creation of many other "specialty" courts.
Senator Baucus believed the Federal Circuit would "undermine the
status of existing regional circuits" and would "lead to a prolifera-
tion of Federal specialty courts" in Washington, D.C. 9 Representa-
tive F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (R. Wisconsin) argued on the
House floor that the new court:
is not going to do much to alleviate the caseload in our Federal
appellate system, and attacks the problem of inconsistent Federal
appellate decisions on a piecemeal basis rather than a national
basis. 1
Representative Sensenbrenner complained that Congress could not
adopt every proposal to create a specialized court. To do so would
result in, as Senator Baucus noted, "a legal system fractured into
substantive areas with a set of special judges for each area.""II He
preferred a legal system of "generalist judges who can bring their
broad experience and background to each body of the law."' 2
The American Bar Association (ABA) passed a resolution oppos-
ing the creation of the Federal Circuit. The opponents of the new
court repeatedly referred to the ABA as their ally. Indeed, the ABA
had written letters invoking the Hruska Commission's' 3 criticism of
specialized courts.' 4 The Commission concluded that specialized
courts "would not be a desirable solution either to the problems of
the national law or . . . to the problems of regional court
caseloads."' 5 The Commission's second report stated:
7. 127 CONG. REc. 29,888 (1981).
8. Id.
9. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 40 (1981).
10. 127 CONG. REC. 27,794 (1981).
11. lad at 29,862.
12. Id.
13. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975)
[hereinafter Hruska Commission].
14. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 21 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 190-97 (1981) (statement of Herbert E.
Hoffman, Director, American Bar Association, Washington, D.C.) (submitting letter from
ABA and excerpt from Hruska Commission during testimony).
15. Hruska Commission, 67 F.R.D. at 234. The Commission preferred the formation of
a National Court of Appeals. Id. at 246. The proposed court's jurisdiction would have been
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[G]iving a national court exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in a
category of cases now heard by the circuit courts would tend to
dilute or eliminate regional influence in the decision of those
cases. Our nation is not yet so homogeneous that the diversity of
our peoples cannot be reflected to some advantage in the deci-
sions of the regional courts. Excluding these courts from consid-
eration of particular categories of cases would also contract the
breadth of experience and knowledge which the circuit judges
would bring to bear on other cases; the advantages of decision-
making by generalist judges diminish as the judges' exposure to
various areas of law is lessened. 16
Congressional sources attacked the legislative proposal for the
Federal Circuit, painting this reform effort as short-sighted, indirect,
insensitive, and wasteful. Overall, the Federal Circuit concept was
criticized for attempting to create a "specialized" court. A special-
ized court would, in the opponents' view: 1)fracture subject areas of
law and deprive them of the virtues of cross pollination; 2) place all
venue in one distant court; 3)risk capture of a court by one class of
litigants or viewpoint; and 4)generally inhibit the orderly common
law development of American jurisprudence.
II. CONTEMPORANEOUS RESPONSES TO THE ANTAGONISTS
During the debate on the Federal Courts Improvement Act of
1982 (the Act), legislators and experts refuted the proposed court's
critics. While acknowledging the dangers of specialized courts, the
Federal Circuit's proponents saw no specialization in its jurisdiction.
For example, Judge Howard Markey, then ChiefJudge of the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), argued in his testimony
before the Courts Subcommittee that merger of the Court of Claims
and the CCPA would actually reduce specialization in the courts:
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is obviously less spe-
cialized, whatever that word means, than either of the two courts
it consolidates by definition since, as the Chair knows, we will con-
tinue all of our present jurisdiction plus.17
Chief Judge Markey also rebutted the charge that the creation of
the Federal Circuit would lead to creation of courts with exclusive
subject matter jurisdictions:
I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that Congress can be trusted to decide
limited to those cases referred to it by the Supreme Court or transferred from other courts of
appeals. Id. at 239-43 (outlining proposed reference and transfer jurisdiction).
16. Id. at 235.
17. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1981: Hearings on S. 21 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of
the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 246 (1981) (statement of Howard T.
Markey, ChiefJudge, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals).
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those issues when and if they arise on their merits, as was recog-
nized and done on this bill.
Tax, environmental, and trademark matters were originally in-
cluded. Congress in its wisdom eliminated those three items.
If in the future Congress should decide, or if it is proposed to
Congress that other fields be added, Congress is perfectly willing
to handle that matter when and if it comes up, and anyone having
objections to those additions would certainly be heard.' 8
Senator Patrick Leahy (D. Vermont) agreed that the Federal Cir-
cuit would not engender any new specialty courts. 19 Senator Robert
Dole (R. Kansas) argued that "[c]ritics have.., claimed that we are
creating a specialized court without noting that the new court of ap-
peals is less specialized than the court it replaces. ' 20
Senator Strom Thurmond (R. S. Carolina) also disputed the ap-
plication of the term "specialized" to the Federal Circuit since the
court would have jurisdiction over a variety of cases. He acknowl-
edged that the Federal Circuit would have exclusive jurisdiction in
patent cases appealed from district courts. He further noted that
"[t]he creation of this appellate structure will eventually lead to uni-
formity in this very important and specialized field of law." 2 1 Thus,
Senator Thurmond did not believe funneling all patent appeals to a
single appellate court would specialize that court. He emphasized
the merits of placing patent appeals in a court with other broad ar-
eas of jurisdiction.
Several members of Congress also defended the Federal Circuit
from charges of specialization. Representative Robert W. Kas-
tenmeier (D. Wisconsin) argued that the jurisdiction given the Fed-
eral Circuit "firmly respects present-day conceptions of judicial
administration: That we ought not create overly specialized
courts."' 22 In support of his argument that this is not a specialized
court, Representative Kastenmeier stated:
18. Id. at 248-49.
19. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 39 (1981). Senator Leahy stated:
In patent cases, the court is almost always dealing with claims of innovation and
weighing one body of technical evidence against another. In nearly all other litiga-
tion, science and technology, when relevant, are related to other human or social
issues, and only a generalist court should ever hear such matters.
Id.
20. 127 CONG. REC. 29,860 (1981). One commentator notes that the jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit is necessarily broader than that of the two courts which were consolidated to
form this court, but nonetheless concedes that the Federal Circuit avoids the label "specialist"
by virtue of the fact that it specializes in several areas of law. Sward & Page, The Federal Courts
Improvement Act: A Practitioner's Perspective, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 355, 397 (1984).
21. 127 CONG. REC. 29,861 (1981).
22. 126 CONG. REc. 25,364 (1980). Representative CarlosJ. Moorhead (R. Calif.) sup-
ported the creation of the Federal Circuit on the same basis. Id. at 25,366.
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[w]hat we have done is ... combine [the Court of Claims and the
CCPA] into a larger, more generalized court. In addition, the
court has enlarged jurisdiction over all Federal contract appeals in
which the United States is a defendant, over patent and trademark
appeals from all Federal district courts, and over appeals from the
Merit Systems Protection Board.23
Representative Rodino (D. New Jersey) recognized and sought to
promulgate the efficiency inherent in the formation of the Federal
Circuit. He stated that the structural reform of creating the Federal
Circuit "will markedly reduce the specialization of two existing
courts, reduce the total number of Federal courts, and add to the
capacity of our system by making optimum use of existing resources.
No new courts or judgeships are created; no additional personnel
are required." 24
Mr. Donald R. Dunner, former President of the American Patent
Law Association and Consultant to the Hruska Commission, took
the sting out of the Commission's criticisms of specialized courts.
He stated that "the proposed CAFC is totally different from any-
thing considered by the Hruska Commission ...."Vi The Hruska
Commission did not consider or reject a general article III appellate
court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals as part of a
much broader jurisdiction. Rather, the Commission discredited sin-
gle issue courts or courts with one type of case.
Committee reports stated that the Federal Circuit would not be a
"specialized court:"
[T]he new court [has] a breadth of jurisdiction that rivals in its
variety that of the regional courts of appeals. The proposed new
court is not a "specialized court." Itsjurisdiction is not limited to
one type of case, or even to two or three types of cases. Rather, it
has a varied docket spanning a broad range of legal issues and
types of cases. It will handle all patent appeals and some agency
appeals, as well as all other matters that are now considered by
the CCPA or the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims decides
cases involving federal contracts, civil tax issues if the government
is the defendant, Indian claims, military and civilian pay disputes,
patents, inverse condemnation, and various other matters. The
CCPA decides patent and customs cases from several sources, and
those cases often include allegations of defenses of "misuse,
23. Id. at 25,364.
24. Id. at 25,367.
25. S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1981) (reprinting letter to Hon. Robert
Kastenmeier, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administra-
tion ofJustice, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives, Wash-
ington, D.C. re H.R. 2405, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)).
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fraud, inequitable conduct, violation of the antitrust laws, breach
of trade secret agreements, unfair competition, and such common
law claims as unjust enrichment."'26
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit's jurisdictional statute27 itself re-
jected criticisms about a specialized or restricted court in terms of
breadth of subject matter. The Act adheres to the philosophy of its
predecessor bills and represents "a sensible accommodation of the
usual preference for generalist judges and the selective benefit of
expertise in highly specialized and technical areas." '2
8
III. COURTS OF LIMITED JURISDICTION
In light of Congress' role in the creation of other courts, includ-
ing courts with a single issue or type of cases, the Federal Circuit
should not have been portrayed as a specialized court in legislative
debates. When Congress wants to create a specialized court or to
vest specific subject matter jurisdiction in one court, it has done
26. H.R. REP. No. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1981) (citations omitted) (Report to
accompany H.R. 4482, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit Act of 1981).
27. Section 1295 of Title 28 gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over:
1) § 1338 appeals from any district court (arising under any Act of Congress relating
to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trade-marks (28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
(1989)));
2) § 1346 appeals (Little Tucker Act) from any district court;
3) appeals from the United States Claims Court;
4) appeals from-
A) the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the Patent and Trademark
Office with respect to patent applications and interferences...
B) the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks or the Trademark Trial and Ap-
peals Board with respect to applications for registration of marks and other pro-
ceedings as provided in section 21 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C.
§ 1071); or
C) a district court decision of a civil action to obtain patents or civil interference
action (35 U.S.C. §§ 145, 146);
5) appeals from the United States Court of International Trade;
6) appeals from final determinations of the United States International Trade Com-
mission relating to unfair practices in import trade, made under section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1939 (19 U.S.C. § 1337);
7) appeals of questions of law as to findings of the Secretary of Commerce on the
importation of instruments or apparatus;
8) appeals under section 71 of the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. § 2461);
9) appeals from final orders and decisions of the Merit Systems Protection Board;
and
10) appeals from final decisions of an agency board of contract appeals or similar
appeals in which the department or agency head has determined that the decision is
not entitled to finality.
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1)-(10) (1989). Section 1292 of Title 28 gives the Federal Circuit juris-
diction over certain interlocutory appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1989). This multi-headed juris-
diction is not contiguous with a claim that this is a "specialized" (one-issue or limited issue)
court.
28. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 677 and S. 678 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1979)
(statement ofJudgeJon 0. Newman).
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S0.29 It has sometimes simply vested exclusive jurisdiction in one of
the United States courts of appeals.30 Other times, Congress has
created a new, single issue court with exclusive subject matter juris-
diction in a specialized area.
Congress has power to create courts either under article I or arti-
cle III of the Constitution. Article III, section 1 provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the
supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Con-
tinuance in Office. 3 '
Article I, section 8, clause 9 states that Congress shall have power
"[t]o constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court."3 2 As
early as American Insurance Co. v. Canter,33 the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized Congress' power to create article I courts.3 4
When allocating a single subject matter to a new court, Congress
has often created an article I court.35 For example, Congress cre-
29. Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, The Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject
Matter Concept: Reflections On the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U.L. REv. 853 (1990) provides an
enlightening exposition on the benefits of non-regional subject matter courts in alleviating
present burdens on the federal appellate system.
30. Exclusive jurisdiction to review certain Environmental Protection Agency orders
under the Clean Air Act has been vested in the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1989). Likewise, review of certain orders of the Federal
Communications Commission rests exclusively with the District of Columbia Circuit. 47
U.S.C. § 402(b) (1989); see Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. Federal Com-
munications Comm'n, 750 F.2d 70, 75 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
31. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § I.
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
33. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511 (1828).
34. d at 546. Scholars have long debated whether a court whose judges do not receive
protection of tenure and salary guaranteed by article III is a "constitutional" or "legislative"
court. See Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 460 (1929) (finding Court of Customs Ap-
peals to be legislative rather than constitutional court); 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3528 (2d ed. 1984) (examining historical de-
velopment of basis for lower court jurisdiction in light of article III tenure and salary require-
ments). Justice Van Devanter stated in Bakelite that the true test "lies in the power under
which the court was created and in the jurisdiction conferred." Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 459.
Other courts have held that judicial power cannot be exercised at all by courts whose judges
lack the security of tenure and compensation. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59-60 (1982).
35. Often the constitutional nature of the court itself has been debated. In the 1950s,
Congress statutorily declared that the Court of Claims, the Customs Court and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals were article III courts. Congress deemed this necessary in light
of case law determinations that these courts were article I courts. Subsequently, Congress
determined the Claims Court to be an article I court (28 U.S.C. § 171), and the Customs
Court and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to be article III courts. See Act ofJune
25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 899, repealed by Pub. L. No. 97-164, title I, § 106, 96 Stat. 28 (1982);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 251 (1982).
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ated under article I the Court of Private Land Claims to hear and
determine claims founded on Spanish or Mexican grants embracing
lands ceded by Mexico to the United States. Initially, Congress en-
trusted the preliminary inquiry of entitlement to the land to execu-
tive officers. Congress required that the officers make reports upon
which Congress could then base the ultimate entitlement determi-
nation. Later, in 1891, Congress created the court to examine and
adjudicate claims between claimants and the United States.3 6
Congress again exercised its article I powers in 1902 by creating
the Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court as a legislative
court.3 7 Congress created this court to determine controverted
claims to membership in the two Indian tribes.38 Tribal member-
ship affected a claimant's right to previously allocated lands and
funds.
Congress again used article I to create the Tax Court with the
single-subject jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Code.3 9 In addi-
tion, in 1926, Congress created the United States Customs Court
under its article I authority to review acts of appraisers and collec-
tors in valuing and classifying imports and in liquidating and collect-
ing customs duties.40 This article I body later became an article III
court. In 1956, Congress recommissioned the Customs Court
under article III. In 1980, Congress changed the name of the Cus-
toms Court to the Court of International Trade.
4 1
Not all article I courts are single issue fora, however. The United
States Claims Court, created in 1982 to handle the trial jurisdiction
of the Court of Claims, has a broad jurisdiction, including the
Tucker Act.42 This jurisdiction encompasses tax, contract, govern-
ment employee pay, constitutional takings, and:
Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not ex-
ceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitu-
tion, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the
36. 26 Stat. 854, c. 539 (March 3, 1891); see also Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 456 (examining
history of many legislative courts).
37. Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 457 (citing Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907)).
38. 32 Stat. 641, c. 1362 (July 1, 1902); see also Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415, 425
(1907) (holding creation of Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court was valid exercise of
congressional power).
39. 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1989).
40. Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 457. The Customs Court was formerly the Board of General
Appraisers.
41. Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980); see also 28
U.S.C. § 1581 (1988) (delineating subject matter jurisdiction of the Court of International
Trade).
42. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1988).
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United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases
not sounding in tort .... 43
Although generally placing single issue courts in article I, Con-
gress has also created article III courts with narrow jurisdiction. In
1942, Congress created the Emergency Court of Appeals of the
United States44 and in 1971 the Temporary Emergency Court of
Appeals of the United States (TECA).45 These article III courts
heard appeals in cases Arising out of wage and price regulations. 4 6
Congress created the TECA under article III in order to use sitting
and senior article III judges from other courts to meet a temporary
need.
As another example, in 1910, Congress enacted the Mann-Elkins
Act which established the Commerce Court as an article III court.
Congress gave this court exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The court lasted only
three years due to Congressional fear that the court was biased in
favor of one class of litigants-the railroads. 47
In 1988, Congress returned to its basic pattern of constituting
specialized courts under article I. Congress created the Court of
Veterans Appeals to adjudicate claims for benefits under laws ad-
ministered by the Veterans Administration. 48 In sum, Congress has
generally created single issue courts under its article I authority.
This technique preserves options for Congress in the event a single
issue court falls prey to dangers of specialization. 4 9
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT-IN PRACTICE
In the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Congress did not
intend to create a specialized court. The Act itself provides for a
wide diversity of cases and subject matter.50 In addition, actual
practice reveals that the Federal Circuit has not become the special-
ized court of limited jurisdiction its detractors feared. Rather, the
court hears cases in virtually every area permitted by its jurisdic-
tional statute and shows no overt favoritism in patent disputes.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988).
44. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 32, codified at 50 U.S.C.A. App. former
§ 901 (Jan. 30, 1942), repealed by Price Control Extension Act of 1946, ch. 671, § 1, 60 Stat.
663, 664.
45. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379,84 Stat. 799 (Dec. 17, 1970).
46. SeeJordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 745, 759 (1981).
47. Id. at 763.
48. Veterans'Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4113 (codified
as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4051-61 (1988)).
49. Article IIIjudges are appointed for life. When the Commerce Court was disbanded,
its judges were transferred to other article III courts.
50. See supra note 27.
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Statistics show that a wide variety of cases, coextensive with its
jurisdiction, come to this court. In the past four years alone, the
Federal Circuit has entertained appeals from the following tribu-
nals: United States District Courts, Boards of Contract Appeals,
Court of International Trade, Claims Court, Secretary of Com-
merce, Court of Veterans Appeals, Department of Veterans' Affairs,
International Trade Commission, Merit Systems Protection Board,
and Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). No single type of case has
dominated the court's docket.
A study performed in 1989 on the patent cases in the Federal Cir-
cuit shows as well that no particular class of litigant has an advan-
tage. 51 In a thirty-four-month period ending in October 1989, the
Federal Circuit upheld the validity of patents from district court ap-
peals seventy-one times and held patents invalid fifty-six times. The
court held in favor of the patentee in infringement suits eighty-
seven times, and against the patentee fifty-six times during that
same period. Appeals from the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences resulted in the invalidation of 107 patents and the val-
idation of twenty-five patents. Taken together, these data equate to
holding for the patentee thirty-six percent of the time, and against
the patentee sixty-four percent of the time.52 Opponents of the
Federal Circuit's creation contended that the court might become
biased in favor of patent protection, as the disbanded Commerce
Court favored railroads. The cited data, however, hardly reflect a
predisposition in the court's patent decisions.
Further, since this court's creation, Congress has acknowledged
the non-specialized nature of this court's jurisdiction by, at least on
one occasion, expanding its original jurisdiction. Congress
amended 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (the Tucker Act) in 1964 to give United
States District Courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Claims for claims against the government under $10,000 (Little
Tucker Act).53 In 1988, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1295 to
give the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over all non-tax Little
Tucker Act claims coming from district courts. 54 Thus, the Federal
Circuit obtained exclusive jurisdiction over all Little Tucker Act
claims whether filed in district courts or in the Claims Court.
51. Special Project, Published and Unpublished Federal Circuit Patent Decisions: A Comparison,
30J. OF L. & TECHNOLOGY 233 (1990).
52. Id
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988).
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CONCLUSION
The traditional view of specialized courts connotes "possessing
jurisdiction in but a single area of the law." 55 Congress has usually
created specialty courts under its article I Powers. By creating the
Federal Circuit under article III, however, Congress distinguished it
from courts with specialized jurisdiction. While the Federal Cir-
cuit's detractors acknowledged that the court's jurisdiction would be
more broad than a single subject area, many still feared that patent
cases would dominate its docket. However, Congress appropriately
addressed the concerns of specialization by giving the new circuit
very broad subject matter jurisdiction. The Federal Circuit has
avoided the entanglements and strictures of a specialized court.
The diversity of articles and viewpoints appearing in this issue of
The American University Law Review testifies of the non-specialized na-
ture and independence of the Federal Circuit.
55. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 4
(1989) (asserting Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is broader than that of traditional notions of
specialized courts).
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